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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEVADA

* * *

WILLIAM R. MILLER,

Plaintiff(s),

v.

CRISIS COLLECTION
MANAGEMENT LLC, et al.,

Defendant(s).

Case No. 2:22-CV-262 JCM (BNW)

ORDER

Presently before the court is defendants Crisis Collection Management, LLC, and Robert Broili (collectively, “defendants”)’s motion to dismiss plaintiff William Miller (“plaintiff”)’s complaint. (ECF No. 8). Plaintiff filed a response (ECF No. 10), to which defendant replied (ECF No. 11).

I. Background

On July 16, 1997, a Nevada district court entered default judgment in favor of Ford Motor Company for \$13,660.16 against plaintiff in a car repossession matter. (ECF No. 1). On April 23, 2003, Ford Motor renewed that judgment pursuant to Nevada law, which requires renewal during a certain ninety-day period and for the judgment creditor to mail a copy of the renewal affidavit to the debtor “within 3 days after filing the affidavit.” Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.214(3); (*Id.*)

Six years later, Ford, through defendants, renewed the judgment a second time on March 16, 2009. (ECF No. 1). According to plaintiff, this renewal was defective, however, both because the affidavit of renewal was mailed on March 11, 2009 (five days before the renewal

1 was filed rather than within the three days after) and because March 16 is more than ninety days
2 before July 16 (the anniversary of the docketing of the original judgment). (*Id.*)

3 Defendants would go on to renew the judgment two more times despite this allegedly
4 “improper” first renewal: March 5, 2015, and March 1, 2021. (*Id.*) Plaintiff contends these
5 renewals were invalid for the same reasons as the 2009 renewal in addition to the fact that are
6 invalid because of the “flawed” 2009 renewal. (ECF No. 10).

7 Plaintiff now brings this putative class action under the Federal Debt Collection Practices
8 Act. (ECF No. 1). He claims that defendants’ improper renewals constitute false representations
9 and unfair practices under the FDCPA and asks for a declaration that the judgments are invalid
10 against him. (*Id.*) Defendants move to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (ECF No. 8).

11 **II. Legal Standard**

12 A court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
13 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A properly pled complaint must provide “[a] short and plain
14 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); *Bell*
15 *Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). While Rule 8 does not require detailed
16 factual allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of
17 the elements of a cause of action.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation
18 omitted).

19 “Factual allegations must be enough to rise above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550
20 U.S. at 555. Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
21 matter to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
22 omitted).

23 In *Iqbal*, the Supreme Court clarified the two-step approach district courts are to apply
24 when considering motions to dismiss. First, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual
25 allegations in the complaint; however, legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of
26 truth. *Id.* at 678–79. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by
27 conclusory statements, do not suffice. *Id.* at 678.

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1 Second, the court must consider whether the factual allegations in the complaint allege a
2 plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 679. A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff’s complaint
3 alleges facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
4 the alleged misconduct. *Id.* at 678.

5 Where the complaint does not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
6 misconduct, the complaint has “alleged—but not shown—that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
7 *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). When the allegations in a complaint have not crossed the
8 line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiff’s claim must be dismissed. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at
9 570.

10 The Ninth Circuit addressed post-*Iqbal* pleading standards in *Starr v. Baca*, 652 F.3d
11 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). The *Starr* court stated, in relevant part:

12 First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or counterclaim
13 may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient
14 allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to
15 defend itself effectively. Second, the factual allegations that are taken as true must
16 plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing
17 party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation.

18 *Id.*

19 If the court grants a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it should grant leave to amend
20 unless the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. *DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.*, 957
21 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992). Under Rule 15(a), the court should “freely” give leave to amend
22 “when justice so requires,” and absent “undue delay, bad faith, or dilatory motive on the part of
23 the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments . . . undue prejudice to the
24 opposing party . . . futility of the amendment, etc.” *Foman v. Davis*, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
25 The court should grant leave to amend “even if no request to amend the pleading was made.”
26 *Lopez v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
27 omitted).

28 **III. Discussion**

 Plaintiff’s complaint is premised on two assumptions of law: (1) Nevada Revised Statute
17.214(3) is satisfied only when a judgment creditor sends a copy of the affidavit within three
days *after* (not on, or before) the day the judgment is renewed, and (2) judgments may only be

1 renewed every six years in the ninety days immediately preceding the anniversary of the original
2 judgment pursuant to NRS 17.214(1)(a). Both premises are incorrect. Defendants complied
3 with the renewal procedures for its judgment, and plaintiff's complaint must be dismissed, with
4 prejudice, for failure to state a claim.

5 Nevada law requires judgment creditors to "notify the judgment debtor of the renewal of
6 the judgment by sending a copy of the affidavit of renewal by certified mail, return receipt
7 requested, to the judgment debtor at his or her last known address within 3 days after filing the
8 affidavit." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.214(3). Plaintiff asserts that because defendants mailed the
9 affidavit too early, they forfeit their right to renew the judgment. This interpretation strains
10 credibility.

11 Nothing in the statute prevents mailing the renewal early, nor does plaintiff provide any
12 authority supporting that proposition. Statutory interpretation should seek to avoid absurd
13 results. *Gallagher v. City of Las Vegas*, 959 P.2d 519, 520 (Nev. 1998). It would be absurd to
14 punish defendants for being too diligent in notifying plaintiff of the renewal. Defendants
15 complied with the statutory formalities when they mailed the affidavits before the renewal as the
16 mailing occurred no later than "3 days after the filing."

17 Similarly, defendants complied with statutory formalities when they renewed the
18 judgment within ninety days of the expiration of each prior renewal. While plaintiff contends
19 that Nevada law fixes the renewal date to the anniversary of the docketing of the original
20 judgment, this argument borders on nonsensical.

21 Nevada law provides that a judgment creditor must file the affidavit of renewal "within
22 90 days before the date the judgment expires by limitation." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 17.214(1)(a). A
23 judgment is valid for six years before it must be renewed. Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 11.190(1)(a);
24 17.150(2). Based on those statutes, there is ninety-day window every six years in which a
25 creditor may renew a judgment.

26 The six-year limitations period begins after the last "evidence of indebtedness" as to the
27 debt itself. *See Davidson v. Davidson*, 382 P.3d 880, 885 (Nev. 2016). Thus, each time the
28 judgment is renewed—giving evidence of indebtedness—the six-year clock restarts, and the

1 judgment is valid for six years from the date of that renewal. Put another way, each time a
2 creditor renews a judgment, a clock starts, and that creditor must renew the judgment sometime
3 between day 2100 and day 2190 following each renewal.

4 Here, the original judgment was docketed on July 16, 1997. Defendants thus had from
5 April 17, 2003, to July 16, 2003, to initially renew the judgment. They renewed on April 22,
6 2003, 2106 days after the initial judgment. Defendants renewed again on March 16, 2009, 2155
7 days after the first renewal and thus timely. Defendants renewed a third time on March 5, 2015,
8 2150 days after the second renewal, again timely. Defendants renewed for the final time on
9 March 1, 2021, 2188 days after the third renewal and once again timely.

10 There is no support for plaintiff's contention that the renewal date fixes on the
11 anniversary of the original judgment, nor does that theory make sense. The relevant date for
12 each six-year period is the date it began—the date of the renewal. Defendants complied with
13 Nevada law by timely renewing their judgment.

14 Thus, plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law. Defendants timely renewed their
15 judgment, and they satisfied the statutory mailing requirements. All three of plaintiff's claims
16 are predicated on the assertion that defendants' renewals were invalid. Since the court has
17 determined that these renewals were valid as a matter of law, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in
18 its entirety.

19 Although “[t]he court should freely give leave when justice so requires,” the court is not
20 obligated to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The court need not give leave to amend where “it
21 determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” *Lopez*
22 *v. Smith*, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting *Doe v. United States*, 58 F.3d 494, 497
23 (9th Cir. 1995)). Thus, “leave to amend may be denied if it appears to be futile or legally
24 insufficient.” *Miller v. Rykoff-Sexton, Inc.*, 845 F.2d 209, 214 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing *Gabrielson*
25 *v. Montgomery Ward & Co.*, 785 F.2d 762, 766 (9th Cir. 1986)). The standard to be applied
26 when determining the legal sufficiency of a proposed amendment is identical to that on a motion
27 to dismiss for failure to state a claim. *Id.*

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1 Determining that plaintiff's claims fail as a matter of law, the court finds that granting
2 him leave to amend would be futile. Interpreting the plain language of the statutes, the court
3 finds that the judgments were properly renewed and the notice was valid. Given that, plaintiff
4 cannot state a claim for relief. The court thus dismisses the complaint with prejudice.

5 **IV. Conclusion**

6 Accordingly,

7 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that defendant's motion to
8 dismiss (ECF No. 8) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.

9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint (ECF No. 1) be, and the same
10 hereby is, DISMISSED, with prejudice.

11 The clerk is instructed to enter judgment accordingly and close the case.

12 DATED October 27, 2022.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE